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SHAREHOLDERS
This article is intended to serve as a roadcmap to guide the prac-
titioner through the unexplored shareholder provisions of the recently
enacted Kentucky Business Corporation Act.1 In achieving this objec-
tive, certain basic strains of analysis will be pursued. The prior corpo-
rate statute will be consulted to ascertain the extent of change and
the continued viability of past statutory concepts and precedents. 2
In addition, a comparative analysis of prior Kentucky corporate law
and the law as it exists under the newly established act will be made.
Finally, the article will attempt to project the problem areas that may
arise under the new legislation by examining the developing law in
sister states which have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act.3
It is hoped that this analysis will supply the Kentucky practioner with
a working knowledge of the shareholder provisions of the new act.
Such knowledge should enable him to anticipate and avoid problems
that might otherwise arise as he becomes familiar with the new legisla-
tion.
I. SHi _oLuDE MANAGEmNT FU NcrONS
A distinctive feature of the modem corporation is the wide separa-
tion of ownership and control.4 As a by-product of this separation,
considerable litigation has developed over the conflict between man-
agement perogatives and shareholder rights.5 A fundamental precept
underlying the conflict is that the management of the corporation is
1 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.005-271A.710 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as KRSA].
2 It should be noted that there is not a large body of corporate case law in
Kentucky. This fact served as an impetus for the passage of a statute very similar
to the ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (rev. ed. 1969). The many jurisdictions
which have adopted the Model Act should provide a body of case law to aid in
interpreting the new Kentucky Act.
3 The Model Act, ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CopR. ACT (rev. ed. 1969), has
been used as the basis for the corporation statutes of Wisconsin (1951) Oregon
(1953), District of Columbia (1954), Texas (1955), Virginia (1956), North
Dakota (1957), Alaska (1957), Colorado (1958), Iowa (1959), Utah (1961),
Wyoming (1961), Mississippi (1962), Nebraska (1963), South Dakota (1965),
Washington (1965), Arkansas (1965), New Mexico (1967), Ceorgia (1968)
Montana (1968), Tennessee (1968), and Rhode Island (1969). It was employed
to a great extent in drafting the new acts in Maryland (1951), North Carolina
(1955), Alabama (1959), Connecticut (1959), South Carolina (1962), New
York (1963), Massachusetts (1965), Louisiana (1968) and New Jersey (1968).
4A. BEruE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
S1933). The phenomenon of owners who do not manage and managers who
o not own was discussed in this classic work. The authors labeled the divorce
of control from ownership as a characteristic of the corporate system.
5 See Folk The Model Act and South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L.
REv. 275, 308 (1962).
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vested in a board of directors who are chosen by the shareholders.6
Despite the broad managerial powers given to the board, certain
specified powers are reserved to the shareholders.7  These powers
comprise the shareholder management functions and mark an appro-
priate starting point for examination of the new law.
Shareholder management functions arise chiefly in the context of
shareholder meetings8 and are inextricably tied to voting rights.9 They
relate chiefly to election and removal of directors and officers; adoption,
amendment, and repeal of by-laws; shareholder resolutions, including
ratification of board of directors actions; and extraordinary corporate
matters.10
A. Election and Removal of Officers and Directors
The initial board of directors is usually named in the articles of
incorporation or elected at an organizational meeting of the incorpora-
tors." Although this is the approach of the Model Act,'2 under prior
law election of the initial board was postponed until the first share-
holder meeting.'3 This procedure created a time gap in which corpo-
rate status was achieved without corporate directors. The problem of
having no directors to hold liable for unauthorized corporate action
is thus eradicated by adoption of the Model Act provision.14
The recent enactment is similar to prior corporate legislation
authorizing the election of directors. 15 At the first annual meeting of
6 It should be noted that KRSA § 271A.175 contains language that allows
increased shareholder participation in management. Whereas the prior act stated
unequivocally in KRS § 271.345 that "the business of every corporation shall be
managed by the board," K.RSA § 271A.175 adds the clause "except as may
otherwise be provided in the articles of corporation."
7H. IHENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTR BusmEss
Emxapsiuss § 361 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as H. HENN, LAW OF Coapo-
RATIONS].
8 See text accompanying notes 107-152, infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 153-284, infra.
'0 See H. HENN, LAw OF COPXOPRAIONS § 361.
" See H. HErNN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 409.
12-ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoR". ACr § 36 (rev. ed. 1969), which is identical to
KRSA § 271A.180, states that: "[Tihe names and addresses of the members of the
first hoard of directors shall be stated in the articles of incorporation.. .. "
, Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.345(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS] states:
"After issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the first meeting of the share-
holders shall be held.., for the purpose of electing the directors. ...."
14 Kentucky's previous corporation act was based largely upon the UNIFORM
Bus. Co"n'. ACT. The procedure designating directors at the first meeting of the
shareholders represented one of the former statute's few deviations from the Uni-
form Act which required the designation of directors in the articles. Because of
this deviation, there was some question as to the liability on the part of those
acting as directors and officers of the corporation before having been properly
elected. See Tri-State Developers, Inc. v. Moore, 343 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).
15 Compare KRS § 271.345 with KRSA § 271A.100. It should be noted that in
statutory authority, shareholders have inherent power at common law to elect
directors. See Bruum v. Cook, 273 N.W. 744 (Mich. 1937).
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shareholders and at each annual meeting thereafter, the shareholders
elect directors to serve until the next annual meeting,16 except where
directors are divided into classes, in which case one class is elected
each year.17
1. Classification of Boards-Cumulative Voting Rights
Closely tied to the election process, and specifically sanctioned by
both the old and new statutes,' 8 is the system of classifying the board
of directors. 19 This is the process by which directors are classified by
term of office with staggered terms so that only a portion of the board
is elected annually. In theory, it assures continuity of management by
providing holdover directors with experience in conducting affairs of
the corporation. But in practice, the device is not necessary to assure
continuity since it is normally achieved through customary year-to-year
re-election.20 The primary objections to classification are that share-
holders cannot replace a majority of the board at any one annual
meeting2l and the effectiveness of cumulative voting, where it is
statutorily or constitutionally sanctioned,22 is impaired.
'
6 See Mut. Tel. Co. v. Jarrell 295 S.W. 865 (Ky. 1927), where the Court
in construing KRS § 271.345 held that an election of directors must be held
annually.
17KRSA § 271A.180. See generally Finkelstein, The Conduct of Corporate
Elections, 17 ST. Jons L. REv. 75 (1943).
18 KRS § 271.345(4) and KRSA § 271A.185.
19 See Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Directors, 11 Bus. LAw.
81 (Nov. 1955). See also note 22 infra.2 0 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2D § 37 ff 2 (1971).
21 Id.
22 See Wolfson v. Avery, 126 N.E.2d 707 (IMI. 1955), where an Illinois statute
substantially similar to KRSA § 271A.185 was held unconstitutional as inconsistent
with cumulative voting rights granted shareholders by the Illinois Constitution.
ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The case is of particular importance in that Kentucky
does constitutionally require cumulative voting. Ky. CONST. § 207. Cf. Janney v.
Philadelphia Transit Co., 128 A.2d 76 (Pa. 1956), which held that classification
of directors with staggered terms was not inconsistent with the cumulative voting
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court in effect said that cumu-
lative voting, though constitutionally granted, was not guaranteed to be effective.
It distinguished Wolfson v. Avery on the basis of language used in the constitu-
tional provision. The court held that the Illinois Constitution was framed in
terms of the number of directors to be elected, while the Pennsylvania provision
was framed in terms of voting for one candidate or another. Thus, a repre-
sentational proportion of directors was not guaranteed. The old Kentucky statute,
KRS § 271.315(2), and the newly enacted KRSA § 271A.165(4), both of which
guarantee cumulative voting, speak of directors in the early part of the provision
and candidates in the latter part thereof. The question of whether statutory
provisions like KRSA § 271A.185, which authorize classification of boards, are
compatible with constitutional provisions calling for cumulative voting therefore
remains open in Kentucky. In Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction
and Classification of Corporate Boards, 22 Cm. L. REv. 751, 757 (1955), the
writer discusses the events at the convention which adopted the Kentucky con-
tuonunuea on nex. page)
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The first of these objections may have had merit under the prior
Kentucky statute, but not under the new act. The old act contained
no provision for the removal of directors, but Kentucky Revised Statutes
Annotated [hereinafter KRSA] § 271A.195 provides that "[a]ny direc-
tor, or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without
cause, by a vote of the holders of a majority of shares then entitled to
vote at an election of directors"23 (emphasis added). The power to
remove the entire board, or at least a majority thereof,24 allows the
shareholders to replace a majority of the board at a single annual meet-
ing, despite a classified system of election. Thus the reason for this
objection to classified boards, i.e., insulation of management from
changed attitudes on the part of the shareholders, is eliminated.
The second objection, that classification of boards and cumulative
voting are incompatible, is particularly relevant in Kentucky where
cumulative voting is constitutionally protected.25 Both the prior and
recently enacted statutes recognize the right of shareholders to vote
cumulatively.26 Although the constitutionality of staggering the direc-
tors' terms of office in order to elect different classes of directors in
successive years has been litigated in other jurisdictions,27 Kentucky
has not yet decided the issue.28  However, the constitutionality of
classification is questionable. By reducing the number of directors
elected at any one time the minority shareholders are deprived of the
leverage given them through cumulative voting.29 A vivid example is
Humphreys v. Winous Co.,3 0 where the board was classified to prevent
(Footnote continued drom preceding page)
stitutional provision. At the convention, the participants detected the problem
of classification and suggested that the provision be made and framed so one-half
of the directors could be elected and voted on at the same time. But this was not
included in the enacted provision and the implication is that since the Con-
stitution's framers were not overly concerned with the problem, the statute per-
mitting the staggering of directors' terms and the constitutional provision allowing
cumulative voting are compatible.
23 See KRSA § 271A.195.
24 ]n order to protect the cumulative voting rights of the minority share-
holders, the removal power is somewhat restricted. See KRSA § 271A.195(2).
25 Ky. CONST. § 207.
28KRS § 271.315(2); KRSA § 271A.165(4). See subdivision of this article
entitled Shareholders Voting Rights for a more thorough discussion of cumulative
voting.2  See note 22 supra.
28 See Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction, and Classification of
Boards, 22 Cm. L. REV. 751, 757 (1955).
29 See generally Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Boards, 11 Bus.
LAw. 81 (Nov. 1955); Fuges & Sell, Impact of Classified Corporate Directorates on
the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, A Critical Evaluation of the Wolf-
son v. Avery Problem, 17 Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956); Note, Election of Directors,
A Corporation By-Law Providing for a Classified Directorate Violates a Constitu-
tional Right, 19 Prrr. L. Rxv. 806 (1958).30 133 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1956).
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a 40% minority shareholder from electing one of three directors
through his cumulative voting right.3 ' Under prior Kentucky law, such
a classified board could be similarly structured to deny minority share-
holder representation.32 The constitutional question was therefore
particularly acute under prior law. The new corporation act, however,
reduces the opportunity for the use of a staggered board as a tool
for defeating cumulative voting, especially in the close corporation, by
providing that the board consist of at least nine directors and that at
least one-third of the board be elected at each election.33 By requiring
the election of at least three directors at any one time, the minority
shareholders are given a greater opportunity to combine their votes to
achieve a proportionate representation on the board.
2. Filling of Vacancies
A topic closely related to election of directors is the power to fill
vacancies. Vacancies on the board of directors are usually filled by
the shareholders.3 4 But under prior Kentucky law, filling vacancies
was a power clearly delegated to the board of directors.
Except as otherwise provided in the articles or by-laws ... vacan-
cies in the board of directors shall be filled by the remaining mem-
ber or members of the board3 5 (emphasis added).
The new provision also vests the power to fill vacancies in the board of
directors.3 6 But its language is permissive rather than mandatory, i.e.,
"[a]ny vacancy occuring in the board of directors may be filled by the
affirmative vote of a majority of remaining directors... .,"3 (emphasis
added).
31 Ohio statutorily sanctioned cumulative voting and the classification was
challenged on the basis of its effect upon the right. The Supreme Court of Ohio
rejected the minority shareholder's argument, holding that, although cumulative
voting was granted by statute, its effectiveness was not thereby guaranteed. At
the time of the decision it is important to note that the statute authorizing
classification had been amended to provide that each class must consist of at least
three directors.
32 KRS § 271.845(4).
83 KRSA § 271A.185.
34 See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957) where it was
held that shareholders have an inherent right to fill vacancies stemming from their
power over the composition of the board. See also In re Union Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.
(Wend) 591 (1840). The court held that shareholders may fill vacancies, how-
ever created, on the board of directors even though there is nothing in the charter
or other statutes controlling the question, and further that the power of election
is a necessary incident to a corporation for the purpose of perpetuating its suc-
cession.
85 KRS § 271.345(4).
36 KRSA § 271A.190.
87 Id.
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This rather subtle distinction is important. In Campbell v. Loew's,
Inc., 38 a provision substantially similar to KRSA § 271A.190 specifically
empowered directors to fill vacancies which were created by an in-
crease in the number of directors.39 It was argued that the provision
precluded shareholders from exercising their inherent right to fill
vacancies on the board, unless such power was reserved in the articles
or by-laws. The court held that by using permissive rather than man-
datory language, the legislature did not intend to infringe upon the
shareholders' inherent right to fill vacancies. 40 Kentucky's prior pro-
vision contained mandatory language clearly delegating to the board
the power to fill vacancies. 41 The new provision, however, provides
that, "any directorship to be filled by reason of an increase in the
number of directors may be filled by the board of directors .... -42
(emphasis added). Thus, any future litigants questioning the au-
thority of shareholders to fill newly created directorships will have to
overcome the persuasive interpretation of Campbell v. Loew's, Inc.
In concluding the discussion of election of directors and specifically
the related problem of filling vacancies, it should be noted that conflict
over the exercise of the power will rarely arise. Granting directors the
authority to fill vacancies, a delegation sanctioned under both prior
and new legislation, is justifiable since it enables a corporation to have
a full board without the delay and expense incident to calling a special
meeting of the shareholders. Usually only during a contest for corpo-
rate control will the power to fll vacancies become an acute issue.
3. Removal of Directors
Although election of directors is a crucial managerial function of
the shareholder, the removal of directors is of equal importance in the
ultimate control of management.43 Prior Kentucky law did not ex-
pressly authorize the removal of directors by the shareholders. Although
the ability to remove directors was indirectly recognized by Kentucky
Revised Statutes [hereinafter KRS] § 271.365,44 there was no provision
directly granting shareholders the power of removal. It is therefore
necessary to examine the common law attitude toward the removal
38 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
39 See generally Comment, Directors-Application to Newly Created Director-
ships of Statutory Provisions for Filling of Vacancies, 47 MicH. L. REv. 378 (1949).
40 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
41 KRS § 271.345(4).
42 KRSA § 271A.190.
43 See generally Note, Removal of Officers and Directors, 8 KAN. L. REV. 154
(1959).
44 KRS § 271.365 placed directors in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
and sanctioned removal for the breach of that relationship.
1972]
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power in light of the new Kentucky provision which somewhat alters
the common law. 45
At common law, the power of removal was predicated upon the
inherent right of shareholders to remove for cause.46 Even delegation
of the power to the directors through the articles could not serve to
defeat this inherent power in the shareholders. 47 The common law,
however, did not recognize a corresponding inherent right to remove
without cause.48 Nonrecognition of a right of removal without cause
might not have been such a problem had shareholders been able to
remove for cause without affording the directors procedural due
process of law. The procedural complexities of providing due process,
where proxy machinery was involved, served as such a deterrent to
the removal of directors for cause, that the power was rendered mean-
ingless to shareholders of a large corporation.49 In response, a growing
number of jurisdictions enacted statutes recognizing the right of
shareholders to remove directors with or without cause.50 Kentucky
has thus taken a progressive step in adopting KRSA § 271A.195(1),
which sanctions removal with or without cause. However, there appear
to be serious problems in reconciling the removal power with the con-
stitutionally protected cumulative voting right.51
If directors are removable without cause by a simple majority vote
of the shareholders, a director elected by a minority of shareholders
cumulatively voting their shares could simply be removed by the
majority. This could in effect reduce the cumulative voting right to a
45 KRSA § 271A.195.
46 See Note, Removal of Directors For Cause, 27 U. CN. L. Ev. 92 (1958).
47 See Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).48 Prior to the ABA-ALI Model Act, there was statutory authorization in some
states for removal without cause provided such power was specified in the articles.
See N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAw § 706 (McKinney 1963). See also Travers, Removal of
the Corporate Director During His Term of Office, 53 IowA L. REv. 389 (1967);
Note, Validity of By-Law Permitting Removal of Directors Without Cause, 59
Micn. L. Rsv. 640 (1961).
49 See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
50 H. HENN, LAW OF COiuORAMONS, § 205, at 413 n. 34. Section 39 of the
Model Act follows this growing trend. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 39
fi 2 (1971), where the trend is rationalized as follows:
More recent statutory provisions, as well as section 39 of the Model Act,
are based upon the theory that since the shareholders are the owners of
the corporation, they should have complete power to control management.
Accordingly, the section grants to shareholders the right to remove any
or all directors whether or not cause exists. Thus, the right of removal
hinges not upon the propriety of a director's conduct, but upon the bare
question of whether the shareholders desire to retain him as a repre-
sentative on the board for whatever reason.
51 See Laughlin v. Geer, 121 MI. App. 534 (1905) where an Illinois Court
ruled unconstitutional the power of shareholders to remove directors for cause
because inconsistent with cumulative voting rights. The ability to remove without
cause only serves to enhance the constitutional question which Kentucky courts
have yet to answer.
[Vol. 61
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nullity.52 In Campbell v. Loew's, Inc.,53 the inherent power of the
majority shareholders to remove a director for cause was recognized
despite cumulative voting.54 But, the court intimated that removal
without cause might have been another matter. Under the prior
Kentucky statute, with no provision to govern removal power,
resolution of the conflict would have rested with the courts and
Campbell v. Loew's, Inc. might have been used to define the scope of
the power. The new Kentucky Corporation Act eliminates the problem
by restricting the power of removal in order to protect cumulative and
class voting rights.5 5 In the case of cumulative voting, if less than the
entire board is to be removed, no one director may be removed if the
votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if
cumulatively voted at an election of an entire board.
Before exploring other basic managerial functions of the share-
holder, the shareholder's relationship to the election and removal of
officers should be examined. Most statutes provide for election of the
principal corporate officers by the board of directors, although occa-
sionally providing that other officers, agents, and employees may be
elected or appointed by the board or as prescribed in the by-laws .5
It has been suggested that the modern trend is to permit officers to be
elected by the shareholders. 57 If the suggestion is accurate, Kentucky's
prior corporate statute may have provided a more progressive ap-
proach to the election and removal of officers than the recently adopted
Model Act provision. The prior provision assigned the function of
appointing officers and agents primarily to the shareholders. However,
it permitted placing the power with the board of directors if provided
for in the by-laws. It provided that: "Such officers and agents as may
be necessary for the business of the corporation may be appointed by
the board of directors or in a manner provided in the by-laws"58 (em-
phasis added). The same permissive language does not exist under the
new provision, at least not in connection with election of the president,
secretary, and treasurer: "The officers of a corporation shall consist of
52 See Comment, supra note 28. See also In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc.
761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (articles of incorporation amendment pro-
viding for cumulative voting held to invalidate pre-existing by-law provision for
removal of directors without cause by majority of shareholders.)
53 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
54 See Note, Rights of Stockholders-Majority of Stockholders Has "Inherent
Right" to Remove Directors for Cause Despite Provision for Cumulative Voting in
Certificate, 71 HAv. L. REv. 154 (1958).
5 KRSA § 271A.195.
56ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Conp. Acr § 650 (rev. ed. 1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRp.
LAw § 715(a) (McKinney 1963).
57 H. HENN, LAW Or Com'ORnxroNs § 210, at 422 n. 4.
58 KRS § 271.355(1).
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a president, a secretary, and a treasurer, each of whom shall be elected
by the board of directors. . ."" (emphasis added). The provision
does retain some flexibility with respect to the appointment of other
officers: "Such other officers and assistant officers and agents as may be
deemed necessary may be elected or appointed by the board of direc-
tors or chosen in such other manner as may be prescribed by the by-
laws"60 (emphasis added). The old and new acts are identical regard-
ing removal of officers.," It is within the discretion of the board to
remove officers when in its judgment the best interest of the corpora-
tion will be served thereby.62
B. By-Laws
By-laws are the rules made by a corporation to regulate its affairs
and to define and determine the rights and duties of shareholders,
directors, and officers. 63 There are two facets to any statutory analysis
of the law relating to by-laws. The first concerns the scope of the
by-laws, i.e., defining what matters are properly included within
them.64 Courts generally hold that by-laws must be reasonable, must
be consistent with the articles of incorporation, applicable statutes,
and constitutions, and must not violate public policy.65 Aside from
the above restrictions, the content of by-laws has been left almost
entirely within the discretion of those who have the power to adopt
them. The old and new Kentucky statutes are identical in their
response to the scope of by-laws, leaving open the various matters
which by-laws may regulate, as long as not inconsistent with law or
the articles of incorporation.66 The statutes are not identical in their
response to the second consideration, i.e., who shall have the power to
adopt, amend, or repeal the by-laws.
While there is total uniformity as to the importance of establishing
rules and regulations for governing the internal affairs of a corpora-
59 KRSA § 271A.250.
60 Id.
61 See KRS § 271.855(3) and KRSA § 271A.255.
62 Id. For a more comprehensive treatment of the subject of election and
removal of officers and directors see the section of this symposium dealing with
officers and directors.
63 See generally 18 Am. Jun. 2d Corporations H 161-73 (1965); 18 CJ.S.
Corporations 186-88 (1939).
64 See Note, Articles and By-Laws-Statutory Requirement of Consistency With
Law-Contractual Enforcement of Inconsistent Articles or By-Laws, 31 No=n
DAMm L. REv. 699 (1956).
65 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D § 27 1f 2 (1971).
66 KRS § 271.285; KRSA § 271A.135.
[Vol. 61
NoTE: SaI _HOLDERs
tion,67 uniformity is lacking in the statutes delineating the means of
adopting, amending and repealing such rules and regulations. 68 This
divergence is immediately apparent when comparing the recently
enacted by-law provision with the prior Kentucky statute.
The old act granted the power to adopt, amend, and repeal the
by-laws in three provisions.69 There was no specific distinction be-
tween initial and subsequent by-laws as under the new act30 The
shareholders were delegated the power to adopt and alter all by-laws
unless such power was expressly reserved to the directors by the
articles of incorporation. 71 The articles of incorporation could ex-
pressly vest the power to make by-laws in the board of directors but
such power was always subject to the right of the shareholders to
change or repeal the by-laws.7 2 A United States Supreme Court de-
cision involving a similar statute recognized that despite any power
delegated to the board of directors, the shareholders retained the
inherent power to repeal by-laws and also to adopt new ones. 73 Thus,
under prior law, it can reasonably be assumed that the shareholders
retained the ultimate control over adoption and alteration of by-laws.
67 See KRS § 271.125(7); KRSA § 271A.020. Both expressly recognize the
making of by-laws as a basic power of the corporation.08 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPOATroNs § 133, at 224, which points out that:
"[Flormulation of the by-laws is a power variously enjoyed in different jurisdictions
by the incorporators, shareholders and the board of directors." See, e.g., ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 27 (rev. ed. 1969) (by-law making power in the board
of directors unless specifically reserved to the shareholders in the articles of
incorporation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1969) (by-law making power in
the shareholders unless granted to the board of directors in the articles of
incorporation); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 601 (McKinney 1971) (by-law making
power in board or shareholders as provided in articles of incorporation). In somejurisdictions, the practice is to have the incorporators at their organizational
meeting adopt the initial by-laws and to have the board of directors at its
organizational meeting approve such by-laws.
69 KRS § 271.345(2) provided that: "After the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation the first meeting of the shareholders shall be held . . . for the
purpose of . . . making by-laws if the articles of incorporation do not provide
for the making thereof by the directors ... " KRS § 271.285 expressly delegated
the power to make and alter by-laws to the shareholders but provided that: "The
authority to make by-laws may be expressly vested by the articles of incorporation
in the board of directors subject to the power of the shareholders to change or
repeal such by-laws." KRS § 271.125(7) gave the corporation the power "to
make by-laws not inconsistent with law."
70 KRSA § 271A.135.
71 KRS § 271.285.
72 Id.
73 I Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933), the Supreme Court, construing a
New Jersey statute which provided that the power to make and alter by-laws
was in the shareholders unless conferred on the directors in the articles of in-
corporation and that the by-laws made by the directors were subject to alteration
or repeal by shareholders, held that a by-law adopted by shareholders authorizing
executive bonuses was valid in spite of an earlier delegation of power to the
directors. Cf. Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
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Under Kentucky's new provision,74 the initial by-laws are to be
adopted by the board of directors rather than the shareholders.75
Accordingly, it is not necessary to delegate the power to the board of
directors in the articles.76 Furthermore, the power to alter, amend or
repeal the by-laws or adopt new ones subject to repeal or change by
action of the shareholders, is vested in the board of directors unless
reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporation. 77 Thus,
for the shareholders to maintain complete control over the by-laws,
affirmative action expressly reserving the power is required.78 It is
significant to note that prior to the 1969 Model Act amendments, the
by-law provision contained in the new Kentucky Act completely pre-
cluded shareholder participation in the by-law making process absent
express reservation in the articles.79 The wisdom of preserving ultimate
control over the by-laws in the shareholders was recognized in 1969
and the "subject to repeal or change by action of shareholders" clause
was inserted. As a result of this amendment the effect of the old and
new provisions is essentially the same.80
Entirely new is the provision concerning emergency by-laws.81 It
empowers the board of directors to adopt emergency by-laws, subject
to repeal or alteration by shareholders, to be operative notwithstanding
contrary provisions elsewhere in the corporate statute or in the articles
and by-laws, during any emergency in the conduct of the business of
74 KRS § 271A.135.
75 Daubenspeck v. Day, 123 N.E. 402 (Ind. 1919) (a by-law adopted by the
shareholders was held invalid because a statute gave the power to adopt by-laws
to the board of directors. The court said where a statute gives the power to adopt
by-laws to the board of directors, the shareholders may not interfere with the
board's exercise so long as the by-laws are reasonable and not contrary to public
policy or the established law of the land.)
76 See Note, Exclusive Control of the Adoption and Amendment of By-laws
or Regulations by the Corporate Directors, 25 U. GN. L. REv. 362 (1956).
77 KRSA § 271A.135.
78 There are occasions when a bv-law might be upheld despite lack of express
statutory authority. In Taylor's Adn'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957), a
by-law providing that no transfer or sale of corporate shares could be made with-
out first offering the shares to the remaining shareholders was held valid al-
though no statute expressly permitted it and it was never formally adopted.
79 KENTUcKY LEGISLATIVE IESEARCH COISSION, INFORMATIONAL BuLL. No.
76, ComPORArON LAW 28 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CoponnoN LAw].
80 Perhaps the best summary of the present statute is provided in the MODEL
Bus. Corn'. AcT ANN. 2D § 27A ff 2 (1971) which reads:
Section 27 is a simple, direct and unequivocal statement of vho has
power to adopt, amend, or repeal the by-laws, both initially and sub-
sequently, and is consistent with the modem tendency in corporation
statutes. It delegates the power to the board of directors, subject to the
right of shareholders to retain their common law authority in whole or in
part by appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation. At the
same time, the content of by-laws is as flexible and unrestricted as the
law permits.
81 KRSA § 271A.185(2).
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the corporation resulting from an attack on the United States or any
nuclear or atomic disaster.82 It was suggested that the definition of an
emergency in § 27A of the Model Act was too narrow83 and as a result
language similar to that contained in § 110 of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law was adopted.8 4
C. Shareholder Approval of Extraordinary Corporate Matters
Shareholders invest in a corporate enterprise on the assumption
that, for the most part, the board of directors will manage the corpora-
tion's ordinary business. But there are certain extraordinary trans-
actions, involving organic or fundamental changes in the corporation,
that are not considered ordinary business. Shareholders are thus re-
quired to approve such matters as amendments of the articles of
incorporation, sale or lease of assets not in the regular course of busi-
ness, merger, consolidation, and dissolution. Since fundamental corpo-
rate changes represent a separate area discussed elsewhere in this
symposium, it is necessary only to provide a cursory examination of
those sections of the statute dealing specifically with the shareholders'
role in approving or consenting to extraordinary corporate matters.
1. Amendments of the Articles of Incorporation
The procedure for amending the articles of incorporation is con-
tained in KRSA § 271A.295. It states that the directors must adopt a
82 MODEL Bus. CoiP. AcT ANN. 2D § 27A II 2, Comment (1971):
[T]he possibility of sudden annihilation of a substantial portion of the
board of directors of a corporation in the event of a nuclear attack presents
practical as well as legal problems as to the continuity of the corporate
business and affairs during such emergency. The adoption of special by-
laws effective during the emergency period as a recommended precaution
was first provided in the Model Act in 1962, and has been adopted in
whole or in part in a number of jurisdictions. Since such by-laws are at
variance with the conventional standards of corporate practice, statutory
authority for the adoption of emergency by-laws is proposed by section
27A.83 KENTuC=Y LEGISLATIVE BESEAECH COmMIssION, INFORMATIONAL BULL. No.
88, LEGISLATIVE HEABING: ConroRATE LAw 196 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LEG-
isLAT HEARI G].
84 Id. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110 (1969) entitled Emergency By-Laws and
Othzer Powers in Emergency, provides that:
the board of directors of any corporation may adopt emergency by-laws
subject to repeal or change by action of the shareholders, which shall not
withstand any different provisions elsewhere in this Chapter or in the
certificate of incorporation or by-laws to be operative during any emer-
gency resulting from an attack on the United States, or on a locality in
which the corporation conducts its business or customarily holds meetings
of boards, directors, or shareholders, or during a nuclear or atomic dis-
aster, or during the existence of any catastrophe or other similar emer-
gency condition as a result of which a quorum of the board of directors
or a standing committee thereof cannot readily be convened for action.
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resolution setting forth the proposed amendment and, if shares have
been issued, submit it to a shareholder's vote. Under the prior act,s5
directors were not required to initiate amendments; such action was
taken by the shareholders with execution of the articles of amendment
by the president and secretary of the corporation. If no shares were
issued, under the old statute the incorporators acted in place of the
shareholders. Under the present act, the initial board of directors,
named in the articles,86 acts in place of the shareholders. As to the
adoption of proposed amendments the new provision requires a
majority vote of the shareholders, except in the case of class voting
where a majority vote is required of each class and of the total shares,
while prior Kentucky law8 7 required two-thirds approval of each class
affected thereby.88
2. Sale or Lease of Assets Not in the Regular Course of Business
A provision in the new statute requires the approval of a majority
of shareholders entitled to vote for the consummation of sales not in
the regular course of business. If any class of shares is entitled to vote
as a class, the authorization of sale must receive the affirmative vote
of the holders of a majority of the shares of each class of shares entitled
to vote as a class and of the total shares entitled to vote.89
3. Mergers and Consolidation
Shareholder approval of both mergers and consolidations is neces-
sary under the new act.90 It also requires that written notice be given
to each shareholder of record, whether or not entitled to vote, not less
than twenty days before the meetings.91 Furthermore, a copy or
summary of the plan of merger or consolidation is to be included in
such notice. Prior Kentucky corporate law did not impose the twenty
day notice requirement. KRS § 271.295(4) provided that only
shareholders entitled to vote be given at least ten days' notice, unless
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.92 In
85 See KRS § 271.445(2).
86 See notes 11, 12 and 13 supra.
87KRS § 271.445(8).
88 See LEGIsrATIVE HEA~iNG, supra note 83, at 196, where the phrase "of the
majority of the shares entitled to vote thereon," is discussed: "This phrase appears
throughout the act, and in the acts of other states, wherever reference to class
voting is required. The phrase is ambiguous and no one at the hearing was able
to give a plausible or acceptable interpretation. We recommend that the phrase
be rewritten in a more meaningful manner." (comment of Mr. Greenebaum).89 KRSA § 271A.395.
90 KRSA § 271A.365.
91 KRSA § 271A.865.92KRS § 271.295(4).
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addition, there was no obligation that a summary or copy of the plan
be delivered with the notice.
4. Dissolution and Liquidation
In the case of dissolution by written consent of the shareholders,
the prior act only required written consent of shareholders with voting
power.03 The new provision, however, requires the written consent of
all shareholders, whether or not they have the right to vote.94 Under
both acts, dissolution by act of the corporation requires a vote of the
majority of shareholders entitled to vote unless otherwise provided in
the articles.
5. The Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
When shareholder approval is required, shareholders who do not
assent are given a right to dissent with respect to specified matters.
If they follow the prescribed procedure, they have a right to have their
shares appraised and purchased, usually by the corporation.9 5 The
new provisions governing dissenters' rights98 parallel the old statute
in many respects, permitting dissension in sales, mergers and con-
solidations. 97 The new provisions permit the shareholder to dissent
with respect to less than all shares registered in his name. If he does
so, his rights are determined as if the shares with respect to which
he has dissented and his other shares were registered in the name of
different shareholders. 98 This right could be disadvantageous to both
the shareholders and the corporation. Corporate efficiency could be
impaired if shareholders were tempted to dissent in part on more
corporate actions. For this reason, it was suggested during the legisla-
tive hearings on the Kentucky Act that "the provision ... permitting
a shareholder to dissent as to less than all of the shares registered in his
name be deleted."°9
There are certain circumstances in which shareholders do not have
the right to dissent, including a sale of assets pursuant to a court order
and a sale for cash on terms requiring the distribution of the net pro-
ceeds to the shareholders within one year after the date of sale.100
Furthermore, the right to dissent shall not apply to shareholders of the
93 KRS § 271.500.94 KRSA § 271A.415; KRSA § 271A.420.95 See H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 723.
90 KRlSA § 271A.400; KRSA § 271A.405.
97 KRS § 271.415(4); KRS § 271.490.98 KRSA § 271A.400(2).
99 See LErGLATIVE H ARwG, supra note 83, at 200.
100 KRSA § 271A.400.
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surviving corporation in a merger if a vote of the shareholders of such
corporation is not necessary to authorize the merger.1' 1 Dissenters'
rights are also denied to the holders of shares registered on a national
securities exchange unless the articles of incorporation provide other-
wise.10 2 It has been suggested that the section does not go far enough
since it does not take cognizance of the fact that many publicly traded
securities are not registered on security exchanges..03
The procedure by which dissenting shareholders enforce their
rights and the definition of those rights have not been significantly
changed by the recent act;10 4 in fact, the overall pattern has remained
much the same.10 5 One difference worthy of mention concerns the
right of a shareholder to bring suit to set aside corporate action ob-
jected to on certain enumerated grounds.10 6 Although the old act
contained such a provision, the recent enactment does not.
II. SIAEHODERI MEETINGS' 0
7
At common law, corporate action could be taken only after the
approval of shareholders at a duly constituted meeting. Such formality
is no longer needed if all of the shareholders who are entitled to vote
sign a written consent to the corporate action.10 Although action by
written consent eliminates the cumbersome process of holding a share-
holders' meeting, in practice it is a device used solely by the small
closely held corporation. Meetings are still required where the number
of shareholders renders unanimous written consent impractical. 109
A. Annual Meetings
Corporations are usually required by statute to hold annual share-
101 KRSA § 271A.400(1) (b).
102 KRSA § 271A.400(3).
10 3 See LEGISLATIV HEARING, supra note 83, at 200, where it was suggested
that the scope of the restrictive provision be broadened to parallel DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262K (Supp. 1968).
104 See KRSA § 271A.405; cf. KRS § 271.414 and KRS § 271.490.
3.0 The essence of both the old and new provisions requires that dissenting
shareholders:
a) make written objections before the vote,
b abstain from voting in favor of the proposal,
c) demand payment for sale at fair market value, and
d) if no agreement is reached, institute court action to determine fair
market value. Id.
106 KRS § 271.415(4) (b).
107 See generally AM. Jut. Corporations §§ 472-75; 19 Am. Jun.2D, Corpora-
tions §§ 599-601; H. HENN, LAW OF Com'onxToNs § 133, § 191.
108 See KRSA § 271A.665.
109 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 138 fl 2 (1971).
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holders' meetings." 0 At common law such meetings could not validly
be held outside the state of incorporation because the entity had no
legal existence beyond the state's boundaries. In recognition of the
modem practice of holding meetings in convenient places, both the old
and the new acts allow holding of meetings within or without the
state."' The only variation under the new statute is the added flexi-
bility allowed in by-law determination of the meeting's location. Unlike
the prior act, the new act does not require the meeting location to be
specifically designated in the by-laws. The by-laws may delegate the
function of selecting a meeting site to the board of directors or the
president, or provide for selection in any other manner "fixed in
accordance with the by-laws."" 2 Furthermore, while the prior law" 3
required the date of the annual meeting" 4 to be specified in the by-
laws, the new act allows the time to be determined as the by-laws
provide." 5
The only significant difference under the new provision dealing
with annual shareholder meetings relates to the procedure to be fol-
lowed when more than eighteen months have elapsed without holding
a meeting. The prior statute permitted any shareholder to call an
annual meeting when more than eighteen months had elapsed." 6 The
new statute provides that:
If an annual meeting is not held within any eighteen month period,
the circuit court of the county where the registered office is located
may, on the application of any shareholder, summarily order a
meeting to be held (emphasis added)."1
This provision of the new act varies from the Model Act provision
with respect to the increase of the time period from thirteen to
10 See KRSA § 271A.140; KRS § 271.295. See generally Wetzel, Conduct of
Stockholders Meetings, 22 Bus. LAw. 808 (1967); Managhan, Annual Stockholders
Meetings: Some Legal and Practical Problems, 26 BAYLOR L. R-v. 129 (1964).
"' KRSA § 271A.140; KRS § 271.295. See also Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S.
417 (1891). One of the objections raised to a resolution increasing the shares ofthe company was that the resolution was adopted at a meeting outside Kentucky,
the state of incorporation. The Kentucky statute provided that all elections for
directors should be held within the state. The Court held, since there was no
statutory restriction on the place of holding other meetings, the action taken out-
side of Kentucky was effective.112 KRSA § 271A.140(1).
113 KRS § 271.295(1).
"4 The time of shareholder meetings is usually set late in the spring. The date
of the annual meeting should be set in order to allow for the financial audit and
preparation of the annual report between the end of the fiscal year and such meet-
ing. The most common months for shareholder meetings are April and May. See
N. McLAREN, ANNuAL REPonTs FOR SRAREHioLDERs (1947); Kelly, Preparing for
Shareholder Meetings, 52 ILL. B.J. 926 (1964).
115 KRSA § 271A.140.
116 KRS § 271.295(2).
17 KRSA § 271A.140.
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eighteen months." s Thirteen months was thought to be too short a
period of time to require the calling of an annual meeting.",9
B. Special Meetings
The calling of special meetings for purposes appropriate for share-
holder action is usually authorized in the statute, articles or by-laws.120
The business transacted at special meetings is confined to the pur-
poses set forth in the call.121 The most difficult problem pertaining to
special meetings is the determination of who is authorized to call the
meeting. Prior Kentucky law provided that a special meeting could
be called by the board of directors, by any single director, or upon
written request of any shareholder or shareholders holding, in the
aggregate, one-fifth of the voting power. 22 The new statute differs in
two respects from prior law. First, the individuals expressly authorized
to call a meeting are different. Although the board of directors may
still call a special meeting, a single director is no longer given express
authority to do so.' 23 In addition, shareholders may call a special
meeting when they hold in the aggregate only one-tenth of the voting
strength. 24 A more significant change involves the inclusion of the
phrase "or such other persons as may be authorized in the articles of
incorporation or the by-laws." 25 Unlike prior law, the present statute
does not preclude an enlargement of authority by provision in the
articles or by-laws. 120
118 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 28 (rev. ed. 1969). Cf. KRSA §
271A.140.
119 See LEGIsLAT HEARIc, supra note 83, at 43.
120 H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 371.
'
2 1 See Campbell v. LoEw's, Inc., 134 A.2d (Del. Ch. 1957), and Auer v.
Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954). Both cases discuss and render
opinions on the propriety of special meetings in light of the purposes for which
they are called. The principles that emerge are (1) the puose of the meeting
must involve matter appropriate for shareholder action, and (2) in determining the
propriety of a specialmeeting a proposal on which shareholders can take direct
effective action is not needed. A special meeting may be called for the sole pur-
pose of adopting a shareholder resolution.
122 KRS § 271.295(2).
123 KRSA § 271A.140(3).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 In Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954), under a similar
statutory provision, shareholders compelled the president to call a special meeting.
The by-laws made it the duty of the president to call a meeting whenever it was
requested in writing by shareholders owning a majority of shares entitled to vote
at such a meeting. The court held that the president had no discretion as to
calling a meeting when a demand was made by the owner of the required number
of shares.
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C. Notice of Shareholder Meetings127
It has long been recognized that notice must be given to each person
entitled to be present at a corporate meeting.128 If notice is not given
the meeting is a nullity,129 absent waiver'30 or estoppel. The obvious
purpose of notice is to inform the shareholder of the time, place and
purpose of a meeting to enable him to attend and present his views.' 31
Both the old and new statutes require written notice of every share-
holder meeting, 32 and describe the content of the notice, and when
notice is by mail it is regarded as delivered. 133 Although similarly
structured, the content of the old and new legislation differs in several
respects.
The present provision allows a notice period of no more than fifty
and no less than ten days before the date of the meeting.134 The prior
provision required at least ten days' notice prior to the meeting unless
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.13 5 It
placed no limitation on the maximum number of days prior to the
meeting that notice could be given. In contrast to this open-ended
provision, the ten to fifty day period specified under the new act is
mandatory, completely precluding any variation in the articles or by-
laws. Although one might assume that the restrictive nature of the
new provision is undesirable, those reviewing the act at the legislative
hearing were not concerned. In discussing the inability of the corpo-
ration to vary the time limits for notice within KRSA § 271A.145, one
commentator stated that "this does not disturb us because KRSA §
271A.132 specifically permits waiver of notice in a smaller corporation,
127 This is the topic of KRSA § 271A.145. It should be considered in con-
nection with certain other related sections, namely: KRSA § 271A.660 which
permits any shareholder to waive notice either before or after a meeting; KRSA §
271A.665 which permits all shareholders to take action upon written consent
without a meeting; KRSA § 271A.365 which requires a minimum twenty days
notice for action on a plan of merger or consolidation; and KRSA § 271A.150
permitting shareholders entitled to vote at any meeting to vote at a meeting post-
poned by adjournment.
' 
2 See generally 18 Am. Jun. 2d Corporations § 485 (1965); 19 Am. Jun. 2d,
Corporations §§ 599 618 705- 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 539-79 (1940).
129 See Note, Notice and Quorum Requirements of Shareholder Meetings, 24
U. Cn-. L. Ri,. 578 (1955).
130See, e.g., Stutz v. Handley, 41 F. 431 (6th Cir. 1890) (stockholders who
consented to or ratified action at a stockholders meeting which increased the
capital stock waived their right to object to lack of notice).
1
3 1 Both KRS § 271.295(4) and KBSA § 271A.145 require that the notice of
the meeting contain such information.
132 Id. At common law, courts held that if the articles or by-laws fixed the
time and place of the annual meeting, no further notice was required. If a special
meeting was called, however, notice was generally required.
133See KRS § 271.295(4) and KRSA § 271A.145.
'34 KRSA § 271A.145. '35 KRS § 271.295(4).
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and in a larger corporation where waiver is not effective a 10 day notice
does not seem to be an undue hardship, and is a protection shareholders
are entitled to."'u 6
Another significant departure appears in the content of the notice.
The prior act did not differentiate between annual and special meet-
ings, but merely stated that every notice should contain the purposes
for which the particular meeting was called.'3 7 KRSA § 271A.145 of
the new statute, however, reflects the importance of characterizing a
meeting as either annual or special:
Since the earliest days of corporate practice, the annual meeting
has been regarded as a forum for free expression of shareholder
views, whether or not sought by management. Thus the Model
Act 38 does not require that notice of an annual meeting state the
purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called, though it
does so require in the case of special meetings. Indeed, it could not
properly require that notice of an annual meeting state the purpose
for which the meeting is called in the sense of precluding con-
sideration of any other matters, since that would limit the freedom
of shareholders to discuss matters of interest to them and restrict
them to matters designated by management. 3 9
Under the new statute, notice of the annual meeting is limited to
designating the time and place thereof, but notice of a special meeting
must still include the purposes for calling.
D. Waiver of Notice
At common law, the prevailing view was that shareholders could
effectively waive the requirement of notice either before or after the
meeting.140 This view, incorporated in the new as well as the prior
act,14 1 simply provides that "whenever any notice is required to be
given to any shareholder . . . a waiver thereof in writing signed by
the person or persons entitled to such notice, whether before or after
the time stated therein, shall be equivalent to the giving of such
notice."142
E. Action By Shareholders Without a Meeting
At common law, shareholder action could only be taken at a
formally conducted shareholder meeting.143 With the increasing in-
136 LEGISLATIVE HEARING, supra note 83, at 44.
13 7 KRS § 271.295(4).
18 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 629(1) (rev. ed. 1969) is identical to
KRSA § 271A.145(4).
12 9 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac ANN. 2D § 29 f1 2 (1971).
140 H. HENN, LAW OF COR'ORATIONS § 369.
141 KRS § 271.295(4).
L42 KJSA § 271A.660.
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corporation of small enterprises, it was required that the requirement
of a formal meeting was a mere pretense that was usually ignored.
Thus, statutory authority for shareholder action by written consent
was gradually adopted.144 Under the new corporate statute any action
required to be taken at a meeting of the shareholders may be taken
without a meeting if consent in writing is obtained from all of the
shareholders entitled to vote on the subject matter of such action.145
Unlike the new statute,146 the prior provision did not allow action
without a meeting in cases of voluntary transfer of corporate assets147
and merger and consolidation. 148
The KRSA § 271A.665 requirement of unanimous consent of all
shareholders entitled to vote on the subject matter of the action could
possibly develop into a source of future litigation. A problem may arise
as a result of more stringent consent requirements placed on dissolu-
tion by written consent of the shareholders. 49 KRSA § 271A.415 re-
quires unanimous consent of all shareholders whether or not entitled
to vote. Thus, KRSA § 271A.655 may have to be reconciled with KRSA
§ 271A.415 to the extent that consent of everyone, rather than just those
shareholders having voting power, is called for.150
It should be remembered that the usefulness of shareholder action
without a meeting, where unanimous consent is required, is usually
limited to the close corporation. Such action serves as a recording
device for informal agreements among a small group of owners of an
incorporated enterprise.151 The shareholder meeting is essential, how-
ever, to shareholder participation in the business of the large corpora-
tion; it serves as a forum for the exercise of corporate democracy
through the assertion of shareholder voting rights. 52
III. SHAr, oraDER VoTING RiGHTs
Having discussed the law pertaining to shareholder meetings and
the functions of such meetings, it is necessary to explore the methods
employed by the shareholder in exercising control over the corpora-
tion. This involves an examination of shareholder voting rights-a
143 Comment, Corporations-Close Corporations-Strictness of Requirements at
Meetings of Shareholders and Directors, 14 S.C.L.Q. 408 (1962).
'44 H. HENN, LAW OF CoRPoRTIONs § 369.
145 See KRSA § 271A.665.
146 Id.
.47 KRS § 271.415.
148 KRS § 271.470.
149 KRSA § 271AA15.
150 Id.
151 See LEGISLATIVE HEARINc, supra note 83, at 53.
15 2 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 369.
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broad topic of particular importance in an era of increasing corporate
democracy. 153
A. Determination of Who is Entitled to Vote-Closing Transfer Books
and Fixing Record Date
At common law, the corporation was permitted to close its stock
transfer books for a reasonable time in order to establish stock owner-
ship and thereby determine those shareholders entitled to have notices
sent to them to vote or otherwise participate in corporate control,
and to receive dividends.' 54 As stock transfers became more numerous,
closing the books became highly impractical and costly.'155 Legislatures
quickly responded to the need for an alternative method of determining
stock ownership by authorizing corporations to fix record dates. 15
Closing the transfer books, although still a recognized procedure, has
been reduced to obsolescence by the record date procedure which
permits continuous trading in securities without postponement of
transfers and thereby considerably simplifies corporate operations l r7
The adoption of the new act has little effect on Kentucky law in
this area. The new provision does reduce the maximum number of
days that the transfer books may be closed in those rare instances when
such a procedure is employed.' 55 Under the new section when a clos-
ing or record date is not selected, the date on which notice of the
meeting is mailed, or the date the board declares a dividend, is
statutorily adopted as the record date.159
Two variations from the Model Act and the reasons therefor should
be noted. First, the language pertaining to the statutory establishment
of a record date in lieu of fixing one has been changed from "the date
on which notice is mailed" to the "first date on which notice . . . is
mailed."00 This substitution acknowledges that, in large corporations,
the process of mailing a meeting notice to several thousand stockholders
may take several days and recognizes the importance of having a fixed
date as the record date.' 6'
153 See Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis, 51
Nw. L. REv. 310 (1956).
'54 Id.
155 H. HENN, LAw oF CoRoRATioNs § 176 at 328.
156 See Note, Corporations, Voting Rights, Effect of Sale of Stock While
Books Closed, 40 MicH. L. RPv. 588 (1942).
'57 See KRS § 271.315(1), KRSA § 271A.150.
158 See Note, Shareholder Rights and Duties: Effect of Stock Record Owner-
ship, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 111 (1959).
'59 KRSA § 271A.150. The time fixed has been reduced from a maximum of
60 to 50 days under the new provision.
100 KRSA § 271A.150.
161 Id.
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Second, the new provision expressly recognizes that shareholders
entitled to vote at a meeting on the basis of record date shall also be
entitled to vote at any adjourned meeting.162 Under prior law, it was
not clear whether the record date remained effective with respect to
an adjourned meeting held later than the 60 days maximum by which
the record date could precede the original meeting. Under the new
act, it is clear that the record date is still effective even though the
adjourned meeting is more than the maximum number of days after
the record date.
B. Voting Record-Production At Shareholders Meeting
Closing the transfer books and fixing the record date are the
statutory means for determining shareholders entitled to receive notice
of, and to vote at, a shareholders meeting.163 This information must
be available at the meeting in order to determine such matters as
attendance, the presence of a quorum, and the voting rights of proxies.
Prior to the recent enactment, Kentucky was one of the few states
without a statute providing for production of voting lists or records
at the shareholder meeting. 64 It did have a provision requiring do-
mestic corporations to keep a share register at their registered office
containing information similar to that required under the new voting
record provision.165 It gave every shareholder the right to examine
the register at any reasonable time for any "proper" corporate pur-
pose. 68
Under the new act, the officer or agent in charge of the stock
transfer book is required to produce at the meeting, subject to share-
holder inspection, an alphabetical record of shareholders containing
their addresses, and number of shares held.167 The 1969 Model Act
amendment of this provision substituted a "record of shareholders"
for a "list of shareholders."168 The change involved more than mere
semantics. Underlying the new language was recognition of the grow-
ing practice of maintaining corporate records in forms other than a
written list.169 When § 52 was revised to permit the keeping of records
162 See LEGISLATIVE HEARING, supra note 83, at 199.
163 KRSA § 271A.150.
264 KRS § 271.315 and KRSA § 271A.150.
16") MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 31 fI 2 (1971).
166KRS § 271.895 required every domestic corporation to keep a share
register or duplicate, giving the names of the shareholders in alphabetical order,
their addresses, the number and classes of shares held by each, and the dates on
which they acquired their shares. This information is identical to that required
by KBSA § 271A.155 except that dates of acquisition are no longer necessary.167 KRSA § 271A.155.
168 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2 D § 631 II 2 (1971).
169 See CORPORATION LAw, supra note 87, at 80.
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in any form capable of conversion to writing in a reasonable time,1 70
§ 31171 had to conform by permitting any record of shareholders.
The new provision also prescribes the penalty for failure to comply
with the statutory mandate of producing the shareholder record
172
at a meeting. Failure to comply does not affect the validity of action
taken at the meeting, but exposes the officer or agent having charge
of the stock transfer book to personal liability if any shareholder suffers
damage on account of such failure. 7 3 By imposing personal liability,
the provision acknowledges that compliance would not be adequately
assured by imposition of specific relief.' 74
The Model Act approach to inspection rights entails two provisions:
§ 31 which calls for the production of a voting record at the share-
holders meeting 75 and § 52 which extends a reasonable right to
inspect the books and records at the corporation's registered office or
principal place of business. 76 It was suggested prior to enactment of
these provisions in Kentucky that § 52 was adequate to protect any
shareholder interest and that § 31 should be deleted in its entirety. 77
The primary concern was that § 31's mandate (preparation and pro-
duction of a record of shareholders at the shareholders meeting) would
be hard for large corporations to comply with and therefore would
run contra to one of the principal objectives of the new legislation-
making the Kentucky corporate atmosphere more hospitable to the
large corporation. An attorney at the legislative hearings pointed out:
It is often impractical, if not impossible for large corporations to
have and make available at shareholder meetings their stock
transfer books. . . [Many large corporations do not maintain
stock transfer books as such but, instead, use continuous ledger or
card systems or other similar devices which are not easily trans-
portable and would be difficult to examine during the course of a
meeting.
178
Despite the seeming appeal of this argument, the suggestion was
ultimately dropped in favor of the Model Act approach.
170 See Freed, Providing by Statute for Inspection of Corporate Computer and
Other Records not Legible Visually-A Case Study on Legislating For Computer
Technology, 23 Bus. LAw. 457 (1968).
171 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 31 (rev. ed. 1969) is identical to
KRSA § 271A.260.
172 MODEL Bus. ConP. AcT ANN. 2D § 31 U 2 (1971).
173 KRSA § 271A.155(2). It should be noted that the shareholder may often
be precluded from any recovery because of the difficulty in establishing damages.
'74 Id.
175 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 31 (rev. ed. 1969) is identical to KRSA
§ 271A.155.
176 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 52 (rev. ed. 1969); KRSA § 271A.260.
177 See LEGISLATrvE HEAmNG, supra note 83, at 51, 52.
178 Id. at 199, 200.
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Shareholder Inspection Rights
Any discussion of shareholder inspection rights should be prefaced
by at least a cursory examination of the common law.179 The share-
holder enjoys certain qualified common law rights to inspect the books
and corporate records, provided there is a "proper" purpose for in-
spection.I80 At common law the burden of proof was on the share-
holder to establish the propriety of his purpose, but today the trend
is to place the burden upon the corporation to defeat a demand to
inspect.' 8 ' The common law inspection rights are still relevant since
they have not been abrogated by creation of statutory rights to in-
spect.18 2 It is often stated that "the statute was intended to enlarge
and not restrict common law rights."1 3 The statutes do not usually
encompass all of the corporate books and records, thus making it
necessary to rely on the shareholder's common law right of inspection
in some instances.184
Inspection rights under the old Kentucky statute have been both
broadened and narrowed by the more comprehensive inspection right
provision of the new act.185 The prior enactment did little more than
grant the right to inspect corporate books and records.186 The new
provision protects the corporation from vexatious demands, extends
the right to holders of voting trust certificates, prescribes specific
penalties for failure to respect a valid demand, and authorizes the
judiciary to ignore the statutory guidelines in proper cases.'87 In ad-
179 See generally 18 Am. Jun. 2d Corporations §§ 174-87, 197-202 (1965); H.
HENN, LAW OF ConponATioNs H 198-99.180 H. HzNN, LAW OF COR'ORATIONS § 199, at 896 lists examples of proper
purposes: "... to ascertain the financial condition of the corporation, the propriety
of dividends, the value of shares, the existence of mismanagement, information in
the aid of legitimate litigation, and the names and addresses of other shareholdersin order to communicate with them concerning corporate affairs ..
281 See Blades, Inspecting Corporete Books and Records: The Stockholders'Uncertain Rights, 85 KaN. B.A.J. 93 (1966).
182-See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 55 A.2d 130 (Me. 1957),
where it was held that a statute which authorized inspection of certain books did
not limit the petitioner's common law right to inspect other books and records at
proper times for a proper purpose.
183 H. HENN, LAw OF Co1'onAn1ONS § 199, at 397.
184 See Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 219 S.W. 191 (Ky. 1920), where a
minority shareholder was permitted to inspect correspondence involving internal
affairs of the corporation which passed between its non-resident president, who
was a majority shareholder, and an active manager. The Court held that the com-
mon law right to inspect included all documents, contracts and papers relating
to the business affairs of the corporation. See also E.I.F.C., Inc. v. Atnis, 454
S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1970), which held that Kentucky shareholders do not waive their
rights to examine the corporate books by bringing an action to recover the fair
market value of their shares.185 Compare KRSA § 271A.260 with KRS § 271.395.
180 See KRS § 271.895.1 87KRSA § 271A.260.
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dition, through the imposition of procedural prerequisites, it protects
the corporation from expensive fishing expeditions. First, the share-
holder seeking inspection must make written demand setting forth the
purposes for which inspection is deemed necessary.188 Second, the
written demand must be acted upon only when the shareholder making
the demand holds at least five percent of the total outstanding shares
or has been a shareholder of record for at least six months.189 Finally,
the right to inspect extends only to those books and records "relevant"
to the purpose of the search. 190 Since the prior act lacked any specific
limitations, these restrictions narrow the scope of the statutory in-
spection right.
Although limiting the right to this extent, the new provision extends
the right in several other ways. The new provision confers inspection
rights on holders of voting trust certificates' 91 and imposes liability on
"any officer or agent who, or corporation" which, refuses to comply
with a proper demand for inspection.192 Additionally, the new pro-
vision gives any court of competent jurisdiction the power to disregard
the restrictive requirements of the act and to grant inspection without
satisfaction of the share ownership or holding period requirements. 193
In these two respects, the recently enacted legislation is significantly
broader than the prior act;194 however, the most important expansion
of shareholder inspection rights stems from the specification of penalties
to be imposed in cases of wrongful disregard of the right.195 Under the
prior act, which did not specifically impose penalties, the corporation
or its officers could refuse access and delay inspection until the case
was actually litigated. The absence of personal liability left nothing
to deter officers from using dilatory tactics which had the effect of
reducing the right to a nullity. On the other hand, the penalty pro-
vision of the new act with the threat of personal liability, exerts
pressure on the corporation to permit inspection in cases where the
purpose is clearly proper and tempers judgment in borderline cases.
The net result is a far greater freedom of access to corporate books
and records.
The penalty provision clearly establishes the measure of damages
188 KRSA § 271A.260(2).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 KRSA § 271A.260(2). See also Note, Rights of Equitable Owners of
Corporate Shares, 99 PA. L. Rxv. 999 (1951).
'92 KRSA § 271A.260(3).
193 KRSA § 271A.260(4).
194 See KRS § 271.395.
195 KRSA § 271A.260 (8).
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to be imposed and the defenses available. The corporation or any
officer or agent denying inspection is liable to the shareholder for an
amount equal to ten percent of the value of the shareholder's shares in
addition to any other damages or remedies available.196 In Kentucky,
deviating from the Model Act, KRSA § 271A.260 (3) puts a $500 ceiling
on the damages figure. In so doing, the new act undermines the deter-
rent value of the penalty provision.
The right to recover is qualified to the extent of certain specified
defenses: (1) improper use of a list of shareholders or information
secured in a prior inspection of any corporation by a shareholder
during a previous specified period, (2) lack of good faith, and (3) im-
proper purpose 0 7 These are affirmative defenses with the burden of
proof falling upon the corporation or its agent or officer.19
Worthy of mention is the body of federal law relating to inspection
rights. 99 Shareholders in those Kentucky corporations subject to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 may demand a list of security
holders from the corporation after solicitation is initiated by manage-
ment.200 The corporation may avail itself of the frequently exercised
option of handling the mailing for the shareholder rather than dis-
closing the list.20 ' The existence of this federal remedy has been held
not to affect inspection rights under state law.202
C. Voting of Shares
The new provision dealing with voting of shares, although basically
similar to the prior act, contains several major variations.20 3 Under
the new act all shares have one vote unless otherwise provided in the
articles or by-laws.20 4 However, the new section allows each share to
have more than one vote and in this respect is identical to the prior
law.2
0 5
KRSA § 271A.165 is like the prior provision except that it specifically
prohibits the voting of treasury shares.20 6 The prior act merely de-
100 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 52 (rev. ed. 1969).
1o7 KRSA § 271A.260(3).
108 Id.
10 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1947) for the proxy rules promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
200 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-7 (1947).
201 Id.
202 See Wood, Walker & Co. v. Evans, 300 F. Supp. 171 (D. Colo. 1969);
Alabama Gas Corp. v. Morrow, 93 So.2d 515 (Ala. 1957).
203 Compare KRSA § 271A.165 with KRS § 271.315.
204 KRSA § 271A.165(1). See generally Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of
Share Voting, 64 COLum. L. REv. 1427 (1964).
205 KRSA § 271A.165(1).
206 Compare KRSA § 271A.165(2) with KRS § 271.315(6).
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clared that no corporation could vote or count shares belonging to
itself.2 0v The new section states:
Neither treasury shares, nor shares held by another corporation if
a majority of the shares entitled to vote for the election of directors
of such other corporation is held by the corporation, shall be voted
at any meeting or counted in determining the total number of out-
standing shares at any given time.208
The provision indicates that shares owned by a subsidiary of a corpo-
ration are not considered outstanding shares of the corporation.209 The
policy supporting inclusion of the above provision is evident. If shares
held by a subsidiary could be voted, those in working control of the
corporation would stand in a position to effectively oppose any attempt
to shift control or to change management.
KRSA § 271A.165(5) defines the authority to vote where shares of
one corporation are owned by another corporation.210 The Kentucky
Legislature varied from the Model Act in this respect and retained
essentially the prior provision.211 The Model Act provides that shares
in the name of another corporation may be voted by such officer, agent,
or proxy as the by-laws may provide or in the absence thereof, as the
directors of such other corporation may prescribe.212 The new Ken-
tucky provision grants authority to vote to the president or his proxy
unless the board appoints some other person in which case a certified
copy of the resolution appointing him must be produced.2 18 In re-
jecting the Model Act provision, the legislature probably felt that the
prior act provided a more explicit basis for determining who has the
right to speak for the shareholders of the corporation.
The right to vote shares is generally conferred only upon share-
holders of record.214 KRSA § 271A.165(6), (7) and (8) provide a
statutory resolution of the conflict between this limitation and the
voting rights of fiduciaries and agents accorded by judicial decision.215
No comparable provisions existed under the prior act. KRSA §
271A.165(6) indicates that shares held by an administrator or executor
may be voted by him without transferring the shares into his name. A
207KRS § 271.315(6).
208 KRSA § 271A.165(2).
209 Id. See Comment, Voting Rights in the Stock of a Parent Corporation Held
by a Subsidiary, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 151 (1960).
210 KRSA § 271A.165(5).
211 Compare KRSA § 271A.165(5) with KRS § 271.315(5).
212 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Corp. AcT § 33(5) (rev. ed. 1969).
218 KRSA § 271A.165(5).
214 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2D § 33 2 (1971).
215 See Schmidt v. Mitchell, 41 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1897).
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trustee, however, is entitled to vote only after shares have been so
transfered. KRSA § 271A.165(7), which has no counterpart in the
Model Act, preserves prior Kentucky law.216 It establishes a specific
procedure for the voting of shares held by three or more fiduciaries
declaring that in the absence of another procedure in the instrument
appointing the fiduciaries, the majority controls the manner of voting.
If there is deadlock among the fiduciaries, any one of them or any
beneficiary may invoke the aid of the courts in order to have an
additional person appointed to act with the fiduciaries in determining
the manner in which the shares will be voted. KRSA § 271A.165(8)
describes how shares standing in the name of a receiver are to be
voted. A receiver may vote shares under his control without transfer-
ring the shares into his name if authorized to do so by an appropriate
order of the court by which he was appointed. KRSA § 271A.165(9)
is identical in substance to the prior corporation law. 217 It performs
the important task of defining the rights of respective parties where
more than one interest exists because shares have been pledged.218
It provides that a shareholder whose shares are pledged is entitled
to vote such shares until the shares have been transferred into the
name of the pledgee, and that thereafter the pledgee is entitled to
the vote.
KRSA § 271A.165(10) prohibits voting of redeemable shares after
notice of redemption has been mailed and a sum sufficient to redeem
the shares has been deposited. A somewhat similar provision under
the prior act prohibited both the voting of redeemable shares and the
counting of such shares in calculation of total voting power.21 9 The
present provision applies only to redemption of such shares.220 Re-
demption frequently occurs in conjunction with a corporate transaction
where the vote of the shares being redeemed would be required,
absent a provision such as KRSA § 271A.165(10). If shares are to be
redeemed, it serves no useful purpose to secure the concurrence of
the holders of such shares provided they are assured of receipt of the
amount payable to them on redemption. The new provision gives the
necessary assurance by stating that "a sum sufficient to redeem such
shares [shall be] deposited with a bank or trust company with
2 16 See CORPORATION LAw, supra note 87, at 32.
217 Compare KRSA § 271A.165(9) with KRS § 271.315(4).
218 See generally Vaseocu, Right of Pledges of Stock to Vote and Receive
Dividends, 1 TEx. LAW & LEG. 238 (1947); Note, Right to Vote Corporate Stock
as Between Pledger and Pledgee, 11 TENMP. L.Q. 241 (1937).219KRS § 271.315(6) stated: "Shares of a corporation belonging to the
corporation shall not be voted nor counted in calculating the total voting power of
all shareholders of a corporation at any given time."2 2 0 KRSA § 271A.165(10).
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irrevocable instruction and authority to pay the redemption price to
the holders upon surrender of the certificates."221
Clearly the most important sections of the voting of shares pro-
visions are those pertaining to proxies and cumulative voting. Both
are subjects of considerable scope and are worthy of detailed examina-
tion.22 2
1. Cumulative Voting
When each voting share has one vote and each candidate for whom
a shareholder votes receives an equal number of votes, the holders of
a majority of shares can elect all of the directors. Cumulative voting
was devised to prevent majority-dominated elections by providing a
method of voting which assures minority representation on the board
roughly proportionate to the minority's size.223 Such representation is
made possible by permitting each shareholder to cast his total votes
for any number of candidates or for only one candidate. The total
number of votes is computed by multiplying the number of shares a
shareholder is entitled to vote by the number of directors to be
elected.224
This device is particularly significant to Kentucky corporate law
because of a Kentucky constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative
voting.225 Although mandatory cumulative voting may be desirable
for the protection of minority interests, it creates rather complex
constitutional problems with respect to several devices which may
dilute the right.226 Classification of directors, removal of directors,
and filling of vacancies have been discussed previously.227 However,
there are several other areas which may conflict with cumulative
voting rights.
221 Id.222 See H. HENN, LAw oF CORPORATIONS §§ 282-83, §§ 364-67; Herron, Proxy
Voting at Company Meetings, 28 AusT. L. BREv. 249 (1958); Hoban, Voting Con-
trol Methods, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 110; Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests:
Conduct of the Stockholders Meeting, 42 VA. L. Rxv. 1049 (1956); Axe, Corporate
Proxies, 41 MicH. L. R.v. 38 (1942); Comment, Irrevocable Proxies 43 TEx. L.
Rv. 733 (1965).
223 See Mills, Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 1968 Dutn L. REv. 28.
224Id. See also Schwartz v. State, 56 N.E. 201 (Ohio 1908); Chicago
Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 67 N.E. 17 (Ill. 1908); In re Mathiason Mfg.
Co., 99 S.W. 502 (Mo. 1907). These are representative of the cases where a
minority of shares were voted in such a manner as to actually elect a majority of
the board.
225 Ky. CONST. § 207. But see Schmidt v. Mitchell, 41 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1897),
which held that straight voting was valid when no shareholder claimed the right to
vote cumulatively or objected to the right of anyone to cast straight ballots.
226 See Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAw.
550 (1961).
227 See text accompanying note 11-42 supra.
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First, exercise of the right to reduce the number of directors on
the board dilutes the right to vote cumulatively. As the number of
directors to be elected decreases so does the voting power of the
minority. Under the prior statute the problem was unsettled.228 KRSA
§ 271A.180 while recognizing the right to increase the number of
directors by amendment to the articles, or in a manner provided for
in the articles or by-laws, provides that "no decrease shall have the
effect of shortening the term of any incumbent director."229
Another means of diluting cumulative voting rights is majority
delegation of board functions to an executive committee. Minority
representation on the board based on cumulative voting at the election
does not assure the appointment of minority members to the executive
committee. The prior act authorized the majority of the board to
appoint the members of an executive committee, without any recog-
nition of the effect upon cumulative voting rights.230 The new act
requires that such power of appointment be specified in the articles
and by-laws.231 In addition, it enumerates certain matters for board
action which are non-delegable. 23 2
A final method which may nullify minority representation is the
use of non-voting stock. Although non-voting stock has been held
unconstitutional in some jurisdictions, 2 3 the Court of Appeals has
held that it does not offend the Kentucky Constitution. 23 4 Language
in the Constitution and statute providing that "each shareholder shall
have as many votes in the aggregate as he shall be entitled to vote
under the corporation's article of incorporation" 235 may be subject to
the interpretation that a shareholder may hold shares to which cumula-
tive voting is inapplicable. The Model Act cumulative voting provisions
were deemed unsuitable for Kentucky since they were not designed
for states in which cumulative voting is constitutionally protected.236
Consequently, the legislature chose not to deviate from the language
of the Constitution which not only provides for cumulative voting but
also specifically states that directors shall not be elected in any other
manner.
237
2 28 See KRS § 271.845(4).
229KRSA § 271A.180.
230 KRS § 271.345(4) (d).
231 KRSA § 271A.210.
232 Id.2 33 Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emerson, 134 N.E. 707 (IMI. 1922); Dewey Portland
Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 96 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1957).234 Williams v. Davis, 180 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1944).2 35 KRS § 271.315(2); KY. CONST. § 207.
236 ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. Corn.. AcT § 33(4) (rev. ed. 1969).
237 KY. CoNsT. § 207.
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2. Proxies
Voting by proxy is an outgrowth of the large public issue corpo-
ration. It was not recognized at common law.238 But as corporations
increased in size and number of shareholders, as a matter of practicality,
early reluctance to permit proxy voting yielded to statutory recognition
of the right. In addition to express recognition and regulation in
every state,23 9 there now exists a large body of federal law designed
to regulate proxy solicitation and voting.240
The new proxy provision in the Kentucky Act is identical to the
old provision, except for adoption of the first sentence of the Model
Act.241 The first sentence changes prior law to the extent that a proxy
may now be executed in writing not only by a shareholder but also
by his duly authorized attorney.242 Part of the Model Act provision
which was rejected provided that no proxy was to be valid after 11
months from the date of its execution unless otherwise provided in the
proxy.243 The effect of this 11 month limitation is to limit the con-
tinuation to one annual meeting.244 In deviating from the Model Act,
KRSA § 271A.165(3) limits the effective duration of proxies to three
years, unless they are coupled with an interest. The duration of
proxies under the new proxy authorizing provision thus lacks that
degree of certainty that exists under the Model Act. Duration will
depend upon judicial determination of the kinds of interests that are
sufficient to render the proxy irrevocable.
In addition, the Model Act makes no provision for the manner of
revocation of a proxy or the effective date thereoL Although the re-
cently enacted Kentucky provision does not specify how to revoke a
proxy, it does provide that a revocation is not effective until the
secretary of the corporation has received written notice thereof.245
23 8 See Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MicH. L. REv. 38 (1942).
239 MODEL Bus. Corn'. Acr ANN. 2D § 33 f1 2 (1971).
240 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-l (1970). See J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Supreme Court held that § 14(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act could be enforced by private parties in personal
or derivative actions and that federal courts could give remedial as well as
declaratory relief despite particular provisions of state statutes, thus retrospectively
invalidating a merger accomplished through a proxy statement that failed to
satisfy the requirements of the act. See also Demmler, Private Suits Based on
Violation of Proxy Rules, 20 Prrr. L. REv. 587 (1959).
241 Compare KRS § 271.315(3) with KRS § 271A.165(3) and MODEL Bus.
CoR'. AcT § 33(3) (rev. ed. 1969).
242 Compare KRS § 271A.165(3) with KRS § 271.315(3).
243 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT § 33(3) (rev. ed. 1969).
244 MODEL Bus. CorP'. AcT ANN. 2D § 33 ff 2 (1971).
245 KRSA § 271A.165(3).
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D. Voting Trusts
A voting trust is created by the transfer of voting shares to a
trustee or trustees, to hold and vote until the purpose of the trust is
achieved.246 It is a device designed to concentrate shareholder control
in a few persons who through election of directors can control corporate
affairs.247 At early common law voting trusts were held illegal, ir-
respective of purpose, on the ground that separation of voting power
from ownership was repugnant to the concept of corporation law.
248
Gradually, it was recognized that shareholders have a right to combine
and concentrate their voting strength by means of a voting trust
provided the purposes of the trust are proper and not detrimental to
the interests of non-participating shareholders.249 Statutes were en-
acted primarily to remove the stigma attached to such trusts and to
place time limits on their duration.250 In addition, these statutes pro-
vided rather technical requirements and procedures to be complied
with when creating a voting trust.251
The new voting trust provision is a much condensed version of
the earlier act.2 52 It authorizes the creation of voting trusts durating
no longer than ten years provided there is a written voting trust agree-
ment deposited with the corporation at its registered office and open
to shareholder inspection.2 53 The 1969 amendment to the Model Act
required the trustees of a voting trust to keep a record of the holders
of voting trust certificates to be deposited wvith the corporation at its
registered office and to be kept open for shareholder inspection.254
Section 52 of the Model Act was concurrently amended to extend the
right of inspection to holders of voting trust certificates. 2 55 To this
extent the new provision on voting trusts goes beyond the requirements
imposed under prior law.256
246 See generally H. HENN, LAw OF Coa'oaAToNs §§ 889-94.247 See Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20
WAsH. L. REv. 129 (1945).
248 See, e.g., Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 24 A. 32 (Conn. 1890); Bridgers
v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 S.E. 770 (N.C. 1910); Luthy v. Ream, 110 N.E. 378 (IMI.
1945). But see Ecker v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 138 S.W. 264 (Ky. 1911) where the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held a voting trust valid when established for a lawful
purpose.
249 See Ecker v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 188 S.W. 264, 268 (Ky. 1911).
250 See Watkins, Development of Voting Trust Legislation, 35 U. DET. L.J.
595 (1958).
251 KRSA § 271A.170; KRS § 271.325.
252 Compare KRSA § 271A.170 with KRS § 271.325.
253 KRSA § 271A.170.
254 MODEL Bus. Corn,. Acr ANN. 2D § 34 U 2 (1971).
255 Id.256 Compare KRS § 271A.170 with KRS § 271.325.
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Although the law pertaining to voting trusts has not been greatly
altered, the new act does significantly affect the law relating to
shareholder agreements. 257 The prior act recognized voting trusts,
irrevocable proxies, and classification of stock as means of pooling
voting strength but was silent as to shareholder agreements. 25s Lack
of statutory authority, coupled with language from the Court of Ap-
peals decision in Haldeman v. Haldeman,259 left the validity of voting
agreements in Kentucky extremely doubtful.260 With adoption of the
new act, Kentucky recognizes the fundamental distinction between a
voting trust and a voting agreement and specifically authorizes en-
forcement of contracts among shareholders regarding the voting of
their shares.261 In addition, such agreements are segregated from the
strict requirements regarding voting trusts. 262
Prior to adoption, the shareholder agreement section was criticized
as conflicting with other statutes dealing with proxies and with prior
court decisions holding shareholder agreements to be nothing more
than voting trusts.263 It was argued that "[I]f left in the act, they [the
provisions pertaining to shareholder agreements] would effectively
nullify the remaining provisions of Section 34 [of the Model Act] with
reference to voting trusts. (Why call something a voting trust and
subject it to all of the detailed requirements contained in section 34
when you can merely call it an agreement among shareholders and
subject it to none of them? )"264
These arguments, although rejected, are not without merit. If
the policy behind voting trust requirements is to prevent secret ar-
rangements, why not apply such requirements to other secret pooling
arrangements equally capable of skewing the vote? The answer, and
reason for adoption of the shareholder agreement provision, lies in
257 See generally Elson, Shareholders Agreements, A Shield for Minority Share-
holders of Close Corporations 22 Bus. LAw. 449 (1967); Note, Corporations-
Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements, 45 N.C.L. Bv. 228 (1966).
258 See KRS § 271.325.
259 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917).2 60 In Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 882 (Ky. 1917) the Court of
Appeals took a dim view of such agreements: "Although a stockholder may vote
as 'he pleases, public policy forbids the enforcement of a contract by which a
shareholder undertakes to bargain away his right to vote for directors according
to his best judgment and in the interest of the corporation. He has no right to
disable himself by contract from performing his duty." In light of this direct
statement by the Court of Appeals that the shareholder must never tie his hands
by contract, substantial doubt arose regarding the status of shareholder agree-
ments.
261 See MoiDEL Bus. Conp. AcT ANN. 2D § 34 II 2 (1971); Note, Voting Trusts:
Drafting Suggestions, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 349 (1967).
262 KRS § 271A.170(2).
263 LEGISLATIVE HEANG, supra note 83, at 102.
264 Id. at 207.
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the practical use of such a device. Voting agreements are almost ex-
clusively used by shareholders in closely held corporations, 265 where
the need for strict statutory requirements simply does not exist. Voting
trusts, on the other hand, are devices particularly appropriate for use
in connection with large public issue corporations where the need
for awareness of corporate control and protection of the investor is
of greater concern.266 Thus, shareholders in the closely held Kentucky
corporation who want to make use of a voting agreement may now
do so without the burden of compliance with technical voting trust
requirements or doubts as to its enforceability.
E. Quorum of Shareholders
The presence of a quorum is essential to holding valid meetings
and taking shareholder action.267 The recent enactment specifies that
unless provided for in the articles of incorporation, a majority of
shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, constitutes
a quorum at a meeting of the shareholders. 268 The new provision is
like the prior statute except for the limitation placed upon what may
be provided for in the articles. The prior act was perhaps more liberal
in its quorum requirements, placing no limit upon the percentage of
outstanding shares needed to constitute a quorum.269 Under the new
act, the articles may not lower the quorum requirement to less than
one-third of the outstanding shares.270 The obvious policy behind this
restriction is the prevention of any major corporate action without the
approval of at least one-sixth of the shareholders.2 7'
The recent enactment also provides that if a quorum is present,
the affirmative vote of a majority of shares represented at the meeting
and entitled to vote on the subject matter constitutes the act of the
shareholders unless the vote of a greater number, or voting by class,
is required by the corporate statutes or the articles or by-laws.27 2 It
is important to note that the majority in question is a majority of the
voting shares represented at the meeting, rather than a majority of
265 See Elson, Shareholders Agreements: A Shield for Minority Shareholders
of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAw. 449 (1967); H. HENN, LAW OF COR'ORTIONS,
§ 394, § 395.266 See Note, The Voting Trust, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290 (1959).
267 See generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS H9 374, 525-27; Blewer,
Quorum and Voting Requirements, 6 PRnc. LAW. 79 (1960).268 KRSA § 271A.160; KRS § 271.335.2 69 KRS § 271.835.
270 KRSA § 271A.160.271 See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 32 U 2 (1971).
272 KRSA § 271A.160.
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the voting shares outstanding.2 73 Kentucky was previously without
such a provision.
The new quorum provision 274 differs from the Model Act but
conforms to the prior law in providing that a quorum once obtained
cannot be lost.27 5 A shareholder can continue to transact business at
a meeting notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough shareholders to
leave less than a quorum.276 An interesting facet of the prior quorum
provision has been deleted in the recent enactment. Previously, if a
quorum was not present at a meeting called for the purpose of electing
directors, the meeting was adjourned for one day; at the second meet-
ing, those present were considered a quorum for the purpose of electing
directors.277
Greater Voting Requirements
The quorum provision of the new act, KRSA § 271A.160, provides
that the articles or by-laws may require more than a majority vote.
Greater voting requirements for shareholder action are frequently
desired in close corporations to provide minority shareholders pro-
tection against adverse joint action by other shareholders.2 7, High-
vote requirements in effect enable minority shareholders to veto action
at the shareholder level. In addition to enhancing probability of dead-
lock and paralysis at the shareholder level, such requirements are also
inconsistent with majority rule and would probably be invaild in the
absence of statutory sanction.279
The prior act permitted the articles or by-laws to fix the vote
required for a specific act at either more or less than the usual majority
vote.280 The new act provides that the articles may require the vote
or concurrence of a larger percentage of the shares than the prescribed
273 Matters for which the new act requires the affirmative vote of a percentage
of shares based on outstanding shares rather than shares represented at a meeting,
together with a like vote of outstanding shares of each class entitled to vote there-
on as a class, are:
(1) amendments to the articles (KRSA § 271A.295),
2 mergers or consolidations (KRSA § 271A.365),
(3) sales not in the regular course of business (KRSA § 271A.395),
(4) voluntary dissolution (KRSA § 271A.420), and
(5) revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings (KRSA § 271A.445).274 KRSA § 271A.160.
275 KRS § 271.160; ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoP. AcT § 32 (rev. ed. 1969).276 KRSA § 271A.160.277 KRS § 271.385.
278 See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
See also O'Neal Protecting Shareholder's Control Agreements Against Attack, 14
Bus. LAw. 184 (1958); Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 KY.
L.J. 125 (1961).279 See MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANr. 2D § 143 ff 2 (1971).2S0KRS § 271.315(7).
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majority but does not contemplate provision for a lower percentage. 281
Limiting changes in voting requirements to those which increase re-
quirements is entirely consistent with the more restrictive scheme of
the recent legislation. The new act requires a quorum of shareholders
to be not less than one-third, whereas the prior act permitted any
quorum percentage.282 Where prior law allowed adjustment of voting
requirements upward or downward, the new act only permits the
former.283 The scheme reflects a philosophy of protection 28 4 and
although less flexible, it is probably preferable to the previous cor-
porate statute.
IV. PNocimuR~s lmATWNG To ACnoNs BY SrmoLDmis-Tm
SuRmnowmE DsauvAm-E Surt
The derivative action developed in equity to empower a share-
holder to derivatively or secondarily enforce a corporate right where
those in control of the corporation refuse to initiate the action on
behalf of the corporation directly.285 Ordinarily, it is the function of
management to determine whether a cause of action which the cor-
poration processes should be prosecuted. If management exercises
its discretion not to assert a corporate right, the shareholder is
deprived of standing to object unless he contends that the decision
was the result of a conflict of interest which motivated the directors
to prevent the corporation from prosecuting the claim. In such a
case, the shareholder may be required to make demand on the board of
directors and possibly even on the shareholders before initiating the
action himself on behalf of or in the right of the corporation. 2 6 The
plaintiff-shareholder in effect sues as guardian ad litem for the corpora-
tion, deriving his right from the corporation which is being prevented
by management from prosecuting the claim. 2 t By the very nature
of the suit, the corporation is a necessary party to the action. It owns
the cause of action and any recovery stemming from litigation is paid
to the corporation.288
Although the derivative action serves a useful purpose in protecting
the shareholders from abuse on the part of management, it can become
detrimental when shareholders act out of self-interest rather than in
281 KRSA § 271A.655.
282 KRSA § 271A.160; KRS § 271.335.
283 Compare KRS § 271.315(7) with KRSA § 271A.655.
284 See LEGISLATVE HEANING, supra note 83, at 103.
285 See generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATiONS §§ 358-84; 19 Am. Jui.2d
Corporations §§ 524-29 (1965); 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 55-76 (1939).
286 See MODEL Bus. Corn,. AcT ANN. 2D § 49 11 2 (1971).
287 H. HENN, LAW OF ConPo1,AmoNs § 358.
288 Id.
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the best interests of the corporation. The so-called "strike suit" is a
device used by small shareholders to "blackmail by litigation" in the
hope of gaining private settlements, the benefits of which accrue not
to the corporation but to the shareholder initiating the action.2 9
Spurious actions which are not settled or prove unsuccessful are often
expensive to the corporation, which must retain counsel and usually
indemnify the defendant directors and officers for their expenses.290
Each shareholder suffers a diminution in the value of his shares as a
result of a bad faith derivative action. Such misuse of the derivative
remedy has led to statutory procedural restrictions and an increased
judicial awareness of the fiduciary relationship between the shareholder
bringing the action and the corporation in whose behalf it is brought.29'
Although the shareholder derivative suit is strictly a matter of
procedural rather than substantive corporate law, 292 the prior statutory
provision was not included in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
but rather appeared in the general corporation statute.29 3 It was
modeled after Rule 23 (B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
with one serious omission: it failed to include language within the
Federal Rules which required approval by the court and notice to
shareholders of any proposed settlement or compromise.294 The pro-
vision, therefore, did not fully protect the corporation and shareholders
against unfounded "strike suits" and attempts at self-enrichment
through private settlements.
The prior act also required a demand on shareholders, i.e., an
effort to secure the desired action from the directors, and if necessary
the shareholders, before initiating a derivative suit.295 The "demand
on shareholders" requirement was taken directly from Federal Rule
23 (B) and remains part of the new provision despite deletion from
the Model Act.296 The legislature probably retained the requirement
in the hope of averting needless derivative suits. A final aspect of the
prior provision warrants discussion. Contrary to the usually accepted
procedure of naming the corporation as a nominal party defendant, the
prior act named the corporation as a plaintiff.297 Under the new act,
2 89 See Haudek, THE S -rL.mENr AN Dxsm.ssAL oF STocxmormE ACrIos,
22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968).
290See Hornstein, Shareholders Derivative Suit in the United States, 1967 j.
Bus. L. 282.
291 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 358.
2 92 See MODEL Bus. Corn'. Ar ANN. 2D § 49 11 2 (1971).
293 See KRS § 271.605.294 See FED. IR. Cxv. P. 23(C).
295 KRS § 271.605; KRSA § 271A.245.
296 Id.
297 Id.
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however, the corporation is a defendant in all derivative actions.2 98
As a defendant it is able to interpose defenses to the suit. This change
creates a problem, viz., to what extent is the corporate treasury ac-
cessible to director defendants in defending on their own behalf.
The new statutory provision on shareholder derivative actions is
a hybrid of § 49 of the Model Act and present Federal Rule 23.1.299
It is built into the substantive corporate law in order to prevent a gap
in the procedural rules concerning such actions. Although it may be
argued that such actions could be more appropriately handled as a
matter of procedural law, the gap created by repeal of the prior pro-
vision and lack of judicial action to adopt such a rule necessitated the
drafting of a section relating to procedures in shareholder actions.300
Section 49 of the Model Act, however, did not meet Kentucky's
corporate needs. It contains rather restrictive provisions on respon-
sibility and security for costs that are more appropriate to the New
York corporate climate in which they originated.30' Additionally, the
Model Act assumes that the settlement problem is handled in the
civil rules and therefore contains no such provision.30 2
Federal Rule 23.1 places restrictions on time of ownership, re-
quired efforts, and control of settlement without subjecting the share-
holder to responsibility or security for costs. 30 3 This rule was thought
preferable and was adopted as KRSA § 271A.245. It requires that a
shareholder be an owner of shares at the time of the transaction of
which he complains, and that he allege with particularity the efforts
to obtain the desired action from the directors or, if necessary, the
shareholders, before bringing the action. The most significant change
from the prior act is the necessity of court approval and shareholder
notification of any settlement or compromise agreement. The insertion
of this requirement deprives the self-interested shareholder of the
opportunity to acquire private settlements by nuisance suits. Although
the new provision was primarily structured after the Federal Rule,
the Model Act was not completely ignored. It recognizes that equitable
ownership carries with it the right to initiate derivative actions whereas
the prior act and the Federal Rule did not.304 The new act adopted
298 See KRSA § 271A.245.29 ) See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CorP'. AcT § 49 (rev. ed. 1969); FED. R. CIV.
P. 23.1.300 KRSA § 271A.245.
301 See MODEL Bus. CornP. Acr ANN. 2D § 49 f1 2 (1971).
302 Id.
30 3 F ED. R. Crv. P. 28.1.304 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 49 (rev. ed. 1969); KRS § 271.605;
FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1.
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this approach and therefore permits holders of voting trust certificates
to exercise the same rights as other shareholders305
A close examination of the new provision reveals that the drafters
followed practically verbatim the first sentence of the Model Act.
Thereafter, the Federal Rule was consulted, with only a few deletions
relating to special problems of federal jurisdiction. This hybrid of the
Model Act and Federal Rule provides Kentucky with a well structured
provision which properly balances the conflicting policies of assuring
shareholders the right to initiate derivative actions and protecting the
corporation against abuses of that right.
CoNcLusioN-Tr END OF TBE ROAD
It is hoped that this guided tour through the newly enacted share-
holder provisions has provided the Kentucky attorney with a better
understanding of the new Kentucky corporate law. It should be
apparent that there are no drastic changes in the corporate law
pertaining to shareholders, but the changes and variations which do
appear would seem in combination to produce a more complete
statutory framework. If the policy underlying the new legislation is
to so improve the corporate climate that large corporations are neces-
sarily attracted to Kentucky, the new shareholder provisions alone
may not be enough to accomplish this purpose. However, they do
at least place Kentucky in a competitive position with other
jurisdictions.
Clyde Kuehn
305 KRSA § 271A.245.
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